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Abstract
Optimizing prediction accuracy can come at the expense of fairness. Towards minimizing
discrimination against a group, fair machine learning algorithms strive to equalize the behavior
of a model across different groups, by imposing a fairness constraint on models. However,
we show that giving the same importance to groups of different sizes and distributions, to
counteract the effect of bias in training data, can be in conflict with robustness. We analyze
data poisoning attacks against group-based fair machine learning, with the focus on equalized
odds. An adversary who can control sampling or labeling for a fraction of training data, can
reduce the test accuracy significantly beyond what he can achieve on unconstrained models.
Adversarial sampling and adversarial labeling attacks can also worsen the model’s fairness gap on
test data, even though the model satisfies the fairness constraint on training data. We analyze
the robustness of fair machine learning through an empirical evaluation of attacks on multiple
algorithms and benchmark datasets.
1 Introduction
Trustworthy algorithms are crucial components of machine learning frameworks in critical systems,
as highlighted by many AI regulations and policies as well as technical research papers. Algorithmic
fairness is at the core of the trust requirements for automated decision making in sensitive domains,
to avoid systemic discrimination against protected groups. Many technical notions of fairness are
proposed and many algorithms for enforcing such notions are designed [1, 8, 15, 19, 24, 28, 32, 39–41].
Group fairness measures, such as equalized odds [19] which is the focus of this paper, suggest
equalizing the model’s behavior across groups that are identified based on a protected attribute (e.g.,
race or gender). Fairness, however, has a cost on the model’s performance, as the best decision rules
that satisfy a definition of fairness differ from the optimal decision rules [10]. In this paper, we ask
how adversarially adding a fraction of the training data can further increase the cost of fairness.
A large body of work shows machine learning models are vulnerable to various types of data
poisoning attacks that can impose a large test loss on the target models [3, 6, 9, 17, 21, 26, 31, 34–38].
Recent work studies the performance of fair machine learning in the presence of noise over a fraction
of the training data [4, 7, 11, 22, 23, 29]. These assume a uniform distribution of under-representation
and labeling bias, or the analysis is limited to having an unlimited number of training data from
the underlying distribution. We present a detailed survey of the related work in Section 6. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first analysis of the robustness of fair machine
learning algorithms in the adversarial setting, against data poisoning attacks. This paper shows the
implications of adversarial bias on fair machine learning, and calls for robust algorithmic fairness.
We present a framework for designing data poisoning attack algorithms against models trained
with equalized odds as the fairness constraint. In our algorithms, we assume the attacker who can
control the sampling process and (in the stronger case, also) the labeling process for some of the
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
08
66
9v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  1
5 J
un
 20
20
training data. Our attacks effectively exploit the fact that fair algorithms equalize the importance
of different groups (with different sizes and data distributions). This can change the influence of
individual data samples in those groups in a disproportionate way, enabling the attacker to place
poisoning data where it can impose a large loss on the trained model. We extensively evaluate the
robustness of fair machine learning on multiple fairness algorithms and benchmark datasets. Here
are the key findings in our empirical evaluation:
We show that there is a significant conflict between fairness and robustness. As we tighten the
guaranteed fairness gap, we show that the susceptibility of fair models to data poisoning attacks
increases. Notably, enforcing exact fairness results in the largest drop in test accuracy under attack,
much beyond what an adversary can achieve in unconstrained models. We can observe this effect
even for the case of the most limited adversary who can only control data sampling for a small
fraction of the training data, without being able to change the features and labels. We observe
that the adversary achieves this by placing the poisoning data in the smallest group with the least
frequent label. To satisfy the fairness constraint, the model ends up sacrificing its generalizability
over the majority group to equalize its prediction performance.
The impact of our data poisoning attacks is not limited to reducing the test accuracy. We show
that the attack also results in a significant loss of fairness over test data. Adversarial manipulation
of the training data prevents the model to generalize its fairness to clean test data, even though
it is guaranteed on training data. The attacker can influence the models to become even more
discriminatory than unconstrained models, according to the fairness measure.
2 Background and the Problem Statement
Machine learning. Consider a binary classification model fθ : X → Y, that maps the feature
space X to binary labels Y = {+,−}. The model is represented by its parameters θ taken from a
parameter space Θ. The model is trained to minimize a loss function ` : Θ×X × Y → R+ over its
training set D. We let X and Y to denote the random variables associated with the features and
the labels, and (X,Y ) to denote the underlying distribution of the data. We obtain the optimal
parameters as θˆ = argminθ∈Θ
1
|D|L(θ;D), where L(θ;D) =
∑
(x,y)∈D `(θ;x, y) is the cumulative loss
of the model over the training set. We quantify the accuracy of the trained model on a test dataset
Dtest.
Fairness. We assume all data points are split into two groups based on a binary attribute
S ∈ {0, 1} (e.g., gender), referred to as the protected/sensitive attribute. This attribute could be part
of the feature set X . In fair machine learning, our objective is to train a model such that its predictions
are non-discriminatory and fair with respect to S. To this end, the training process needs to be
adjusted to equalize the prediction behavior of the model across the two groups [15, 16, 19, 25, 40].
In this work, we focus on equalized odds, which is a widely-used definition for group fairness [19]. A
model is fair if, given the true label for a data point, the model’s prediction on a data point and its
sensitive attribute are conditionally independent. We use a relaxed notion of equalized odds.
Definition 1 (Equalized odds). A binary classifier fθ is δ-fair under equalized odds if
∆(θ,D) := max
y∈{0,1}
|Pr
D
[fθ(X) 6= y|S = 0, Y = y]− PrD [fθ(X) 6= y|S = 1, Y = y]| ≤ δ, (1)
where, the probabilities are computed empirically over the training data set D. We refer to ∆ as the
model’s empirical fairness gap. A model satisfies exact fairness when δ = 0.
Fairness is achieved by ensuring δ-fairness empirically on the model’s training set, e.g., through
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minimizing the model’s empirical loss under δ-fairness as a constraint [1] or post-processing [19]. We
define the constraint C(θ,D) := ∆(θ,D)− δ ≤ 0 as a fairness constraint for the model.
Data poisoning. An adversary might be able to contaminate the training dataset in order
to degrade the test accuracy of a classification model. In this setting, we assume the training set
is composed of the clean dataset Dc of size n, and the poisoning dataset Dp of size n, which is
contributed by the attacker. The level of contamination is determined by  (the ratio of the size of
the poisoning data over the clean data in the training set). The attacker’s objective is to maximize
the loss of the classifier over the data distribution (evaluated using the test dataset). This objective
can be stated as a bi-level optimization problem subject to the fairness constraint C(θ,D) ≤ 0 :
max
Dp
E(X,Y )[`(θˆ;X,Y )], where θˆ := argmin
θ∈Θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
|Dc ∪ Dp| , such that C(θ,Dc ∪ Dp) ≤ 0, (2)
where the expectation is taken over the underlying distribution of the (clean) data.
Problem statement. The primary research question that we investigate in this paper is whether,
how, and why training a model with (equalized odds) fairness can compromise its robustness to data
poisoning attacks, compared with unconstrained models (without any fairness constraint).
We assume that the attacker has access to Dc, and knows the learning task, the structure of
the classification model, the learning hyper-parameters, and the fairness constraint on the target
model. A strong threat model involves the attacker that can craft any arbitrary poisoning data
Dp. In this paper, however, we focus on a more restricted yet more realistic attack scenario,
where the attacker is restricted to select the feature vector of the poisoning data from an attack
dataset Dk, which is sampled from the same underlying distribution of the clean dataset. Two
variations of the attack are adversarial sampling, where Dp ⊂ Dk, and adversarial labeling,
where Dp ⊂ Dk ∪ {(x, 1− y) : (x, y) ∈ Dk}. Adversarial labeling is a more powerful attack as the
attacker is also allowed to craft the labels (via label flipping) for generating the poisoning data.
The rationale for considering adversarial sampling and adversarial labeling attacks is that, in a
realistic scenario, the attacker might not be able to craft feature vectors (i.e., generate fake loan
applications). However, he could be part of a system that can introduce a bias in the sampling
process for the training data, by ignoring some samples and including the others. In addition to
this, the attacker could also be capable of influencing the decision making for some data points (i.e.,
producing labels) which later will be used as part of the target model’s training set. Our objective is
to design these forms of poisoning attacks that introduce an adversarial bias into the training set
of fair models.
3 Optimization Framework for Adversarial Bias
The bi-level optimization problem (2) is non-convex and intractable [2, 12, 18]. The fairness constraint
in the inner optimization makes the problem even more difficult.1 In this section, we present a
number of approximations for problem (2) which enables us to design effective attack algorithms.
We first approximate the loss function (which is maximized in the outer optimization of Eq. (2)) by
following the same techniques used for designing poisoning attacks against unconstrained models [37].
For this reason, let θˆ be the solution to the inner optimization in (2). We use the loss on the clean
1We would like to point out that, for the unconstrained model, under the convex assumption of the loss function, it
is possible for the attacker to find the approximate solution by replacing the inner optimization with its stationarity
(KKT) condition [3, 26, 35].
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training data as an approximation for the loss over the underlying data distribution (of test data).
E(X,Y )[`(θˆ;X,Y )] ≈
L(θˆ;Dtest)
|Dtest| ≈
L(θˆ;Dc)
|Dc| ≤
L(θˆ;Dc ∪ Dp)
|Dc| (3)
The inequality provides a valid upper bound, as the loss function ` is non-negative. Note that this
bound becomes tighter if the fair model fθ fits the poisoned training dataset well. With the same
line of reasoning, we replace the objective of the inner minimization in Eq. (2) with L(θ;Dc∪Dp)/n,
where n is the size of the clean training dataset Dc.
The fairness constraint in the inner optimization of Eq. (2) makes it hard to track the influence
of Dp on the training loss. We use a Lagrange multiplier λ ∈ R+ to replace the constraint for the
inner optimization problem with a penalizing term:
min
θ∈Θ
[L(θ;D)
n
, s.t. C(θ,D) ≤ 0
]
= min
θ∈Θ
max
λ∈R+
(L(θ;D)
n
+ λC(θ,D)
)
≥ max
λ∈R+
min
θ∈Θ
(L(θ;D)
n
+ λC(θ,D)
)
, (4)
where D = Dc ∪ Dp. The last inequality in Eq. (4) follows from the weak duality theorem [5].
Based on the dual problem, the attacker can try to find a poisoning dataset Dp by maximizing a
lower bound provided by the Lagrangian function minθ∈Θ (L(θ;D)/n + λC(θ,D)) for a fixed λ ∈ R+.
Indeed, maximizing the lower bound provided by the Lagrangian function would result in a solution
with a high loss (which is guaranteed to be at least equal to the loss for the lower bound) for the
original problem.
In this optimization procedure, we can also replace the fairness constraint C(θ,D) := ∆(θ,D)− δ
with the fairness gap ∆(θ,D), because the constant value δ ≥ 0 does not affect the solution for the
Lagrangian. Finally, by considering all the above-mentioned steps, the new attacker’s objective is:
max
Dp
min
θ∈Θ
(L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
n
+ λ∆(θ,Dc ∪ Dp)
)
. (5)
Thus, the goal is to find a poisoning dataset that maximizes a linear combination of the training
loss and the model’s violation from the fairness constraint, where λ controls the penalty for the
violation.
4 Attack Algorithms
In Section 3, we explained how the objective of an optimal attacker could be interpreted as (5).
Towards solving (5), the attacker needs to overcome a number of subtle challenges: the loss function
and the constraint are non-convex functions of the model parameter θ ∈ Θ, and the fairness gap is not
an additive function of the training data points (x, y) ∈ D. These two keep little hope to solve Eq. (5)
without further assumptions. To overcome these issues, in Section 4.1, we find an approximation for
the fairness gap which is additive in the training data points. By using this additivity property, we
design an online algorithm for the data poisoning attack. We further prove the optimality of our
algorithm for this modified objective under some reasonable conditions. In Section 4.2, we present
another variant of such online algorithms, which under the Lagrange multiplier λ = 0 is equivalent
to the prior poisoning attack algorithms against unconstrained models [27, 37].
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Algorithm 1 Online Gradient Descent Algorithm for Generating Poisoning Data for Fair Models
1: Input: Clean data Dc, n = |Dc|, feasible poisoning set F(Dk), number of poisoning data n,
penalty parameter (Lagrange multiplier) λ, learning rate η.
2: Output: Poisoning dataset Dp.
3: Initialize θ0 ∈ Θ
4: for t = 1, · · · , n do
5: (xt, yt)← argmax(x,y)∈F(Dk)
[
 · `(θt−1;x, y) + λ ·∆ (θt−1,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)]
6: Dp ← Dp ∪ {(xt, yt)}
7: θt ← θt−1 − η
(∇L(θt−1;Dc)
n +∇
[
 · `(θt−1;xt, yt) + λ ·∆(θt−1,Dc ∪ {(xt, yt)}n)
])
8: end for
4.1 An Approximation for the Fairness Gap
To design an additive approximation of the fairness gap ∆, we consider the contribution of each
training data point to the fairness gap independently. Let {(x, y)}k be the k repetition of a single
data point (x, y). Thus D ∪ {(x, y)}k is equivalent to adding k copies of the data point (x, y) to set
D. In this setting, for any data point (x, y) ∈ Dp, ∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n) is a proxy for measuring
the contribution of that data point to the fairness gap ∆(θ,Dc ∪ Dp), and its maximum over all
data points in Dp provides an upper bound on the fairness gap of the model when the size of the
poisoning set is n. Thus, we get an approximation for the fairness gap as follows:
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ Dp) ≈ 1
n
∑
(x,y)∈Dp
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n) . (6)
By substituting the fairness gap with its surrogate function, the objective of the attacker is to
solve:
M∗ = max
Dp
min
θ∈Θ
 1
n
L (θ;Dc ∪ Dp) + λ
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈Dp
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M(Dp)
, (7)
where M(Dp) is the loss which is incurred by any poisoning dataset Dp on the fair model, and M∗
is the maximum loss under the optimal attack.
Algorithm 1, a variant of the online gradient descent methods [20], is our solution to the
problem (7). It initializes a model θ0 ∈ Θ, and identifies n poisoning data points iteratively.
The feasible set of poisoning points F(Dk) is determined by the capabilities of the attacker. For
adversarial sampling attacks, we have F(Dk) = Dk, and for adversarial labeling attacks, we have
F(Dk) = Dk ∪ {(x, 1− y) : (x, y) ∈ Dk}. The algorithm iteratively performs the following steps:
Data point selection. (Algorithm 1, line 5): It selects a data point with the highest impact on
a weighted sum of the loss function and the fairness gap with respect to the model parameter θt−1.
Parameter update. (Algorithm 1, line 7): The parameters are updated to minimize the
penalized loss function based on the selected data point (xt, yt). In this way, the algorithm (through
the approximations made by the Lagrange multiplier and the surrogate function) keeps track of the
fair model under the set of already selected poisoning data points by the attack.
In Theorem 1, by following the approach proposed by [37], we relate the performance of
Algorithm 1 with the loss of the optimal attack for Eq. (7). Moreover, in Appendix B.2, we
prove that under some reasonable conditions (e.g., by using similar assumptions made by [13] to
approximate the fairness gap), our algorithm finds the (nearly) optimal solution for Eq. (7).
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Theorem 1. Let D∗p be the data poisoning set produced by Algorithm 1. Let Regret(n) be the regret
of this online learning algorithm after n steps. The performance of the algorithm is guaranteed by
M∗ −M(D∗p) ≤
Regret(n)
n
, (8)
where, M∗ and M(D∗p) represent the loss of the fair model under the optimal data poisoning attack
and the poisoning set D∗p, respectively.
4.2 A Surrogate Function for the Target Model
In this section, we present a second algorithm that differs from Algorithm 1 in its parameter update
step, but is the same in its data point selection approach. Indeed, in Algorithm 1, the parameter
update step provides an approximation (through adding the fairness constraint as a penalizing term
and approximating the fairness gap) for the target fair model. An alternative strategy, for an attacker,
could be iteratively adding data points that maximize a combination of the loss and the fairness
gap, however, over the parameters of the unconstrained model. In this case, θt would represent the
parameters of an unconstrained model, without considering the fairness constraint. Thus we update
the parameters of the model in the direction of decreasing the loss for the unconstrained model:
θt ← θt−1 − η
(∇L(θt−1;Dc)
n
+  · ∇`(θt−1;xt, yt)
)
. (9)
The pseudo-code of this algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2 in Appendix B.3. An intuitive
explanation of Algorithm 2 is as follows: the attacker, from the result of the parameter update
step (9), would be able to estimate the unconstrained model (as a surrogate for the target fair model)
over the set of currently selected points. Then, a point with the largest value for a weighted sum
of the loss and the fairness gap for the estimated surrogate model, potentially has a large impact
on reducing the accuracy of the fair model. We should point out that Algorithm 2 reduces the
chance of getting stuck in local minima because, in each parameter update, it makes a step towards
the negative gradient of the exact unconstrained loss. This is in contrast with Algorithm 1, where
due to the difficulty of approximating a constrained max-min problem, it might converge to some
parameters not so close to the actual fair model or even not converge.
Note that, in our algorithms, if we set λ = 0, the adversarial bias attacks and their objectives are
similar to the data poisoning attacks against the unconstrained models, e.g., the work of Steinhardt
et al. [37]. However, without taking into account the influence of the poisoning data on the fairness
gap (as we do in the data point selection step), the attacker would not be as effective. In Section 5,
we empirically investigate to what extend considering both the loss and fairness gap in designing
attacks affects the accuracy of a fair model (which is trained over the union of clean data and
poisoning data).
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the main findings of our experiments. See details and results in Appendix D.
5.1 Evaluation Setup
Datasets and models. We train logistic regression models on the COMPAS dataset [30] and the
Adult dataset [14], which are benchmark datasets in the fairness literature. We use race (white/black)
in the COMPAS dataset, and gender in the Adult dataset, as the sensitive attribute S (which is part
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of the feature vector X ). The accuracy of classification models on these two datasets is low and close
to predicting the most frequent label in the set. This does not help understanding the behavior of
models in the presence of poisoning data. Hence, we perform a data pre-processing to separate hard
examples from the data that we use for the clean training data Dc, test data Dtest, and the attack
dataset Dk. Hard examples are data points with large loss on a trained model on the entire dataset.
We will use hard examples as one of our baselines. We also add hard examples to the attack dataset.
Fair machine learning algorithms. We train logistic regression models with an equalized
odds fairness constraint, by using the post-processing approach (the original exact equalized odds
algorithm) [19] and the reductions approach (the relaxed equalized odds algorithm) [1]. See
Appendix C.
Adversarial bias. Attacker adds poisoning data selected from the attack dataset Dk using
Algorithm 1 (with λ =  on COMPAS, and λ = 0.1 on Adult), and Algorithm 2 (with λ = 100 for
both datasets). We use Algorithm 2 with λ = 0 to attack unconstrained models. We use the same
learning rate η = 0.001 in both algorithms. See Appendix D.2 for a discussion on choosing λ.
Baseline algorithms. In addition to comparing with prior data poisoning attacks against
unconstrained models [37], we also consider the following baselines. Random sampling : Attacker
randomly selects data points from Dk. Label flipping : Attacker randomly selects data points from
Dk and flips their labels. Hard examples : Attacker randomly selects data points from the set of hard
examples.
5.2 Evaluation Results
In this section, we present the experimental results on the COMPAS dataset. We run each experiment
100 times, with randomizing the datasets and random seeds in the algorithms, and report the average
and standard deviation values. See Appendix D for the full results on COMPAS dataset, as well as
the same evaluations on the Adult dataset (in which we observe the same patterns).
Conflict between fairness and robustness. Figure 1 compares the test accuracy of uncon-
strained models and fair models under data poisoning attacks. We attack the unconstrained models
using Algorithm 2 with λ = 0 (no fairness constraint), which is equivalent to the optimal attack [37].
We attack the fair models using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100, and Algorithm 1 with λ = . The
baselines, e.g., adding randomly selected hard examples, do not have much effect on test accuracy.
However, under attacks with the same capability, the fair models are noticeably less robust than
unconstrained models. At  = 0.2, the test accuracy of fair models approaches what can be achieved
even by a constant classifier. The significant outcomes can be evidently observed in the plots on
adversarial sampling, where the adversary cannot change data labels (so effectively he is adding
clean data, but in an adversarially biased manner).
In the benign setting ( = 0), the reduction approach [1] (relaxed equalized odds with δ = 0.01)
has a visibly better test accuracy compared to post-processing approach [19] (exact equalized odds,
δ = 0), which reflects the cost of fairness on model accuracy. Figure 2(a) shows that this cost is
significantly amplified for fair models under attack, as we train models with larger levels of fairness
(i.e., smaller δ). Notably, comparing δ = 0.1 (weaker fairness) with δ = 0.01 (stronger fairness) on
the reduction approach [1], as  increases, shows that robustness against adversarial bias decreases
as we increase the enforced fairness level. Thus, robustness and fairness are in conflict.
Implication of adversarial bias for majority vs. minority groups. Figures 2(b) and 2(c)
show the test accuracy for the majority and minority groups. We observe that the impact of adversarial
bias is not homogeneous across different groups in test data. To understand the implications of the
attack, observe the relation between test accuracy of two groups on the unconstrained model, and
then compare it with the same in fair models (all under the same poisoning data). We observe that,
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Figure 1: Test accuracy of unconstrained and fair models under data poisoning attacks – COMPAS
dataset. The x-axis  is the ratio of the size of poisoning dataset Dp to the size of clean dataset
Dc, and reflects the contamination level of training set. We compare the impact of adversarial bias
with baselines and poisoning attacks against unconstrained models, for various . The difference
between test accuracy at  = 0 (benign setting) and larger  values reflects the impact of the attack.
Constant prediction always outputs the majority label in clean dataset.
on fair models the attack is significantly more impactful on the majority group. However, on the
unconstrained model, the minority group is the one that incurs a larger loss.
We also compute the fairness gap on the unconstrained model with respect to the training data
(see Figure 9 for all results). On training data poisoned with Algorithm 2 (λ = 100) at  = 0.1,
the fairness gap is 0.54, which is much larger than that of the random sampling baseline with 0.3
fairness gap. This indicates that the data poisoning attack for adversarial bias increases the fairness
gap. This explains the underlying strategy of the attacker against fair machine learning: to increase
fairness gap and distort the data distribution of mainly the minority group in order to force the fair
algorithm to lower the accuracy over the whole distribution when trying to equalize its behavior
across the groups.
Distribution and importance of poisoning data. We investigate where exactly the poisoning
data are placed under attacks designed for adversarial bias. We observe that the data samples
generated by our most effective attack, Algorithm 2 with λ = 100, mostly belong to the smallest
subgroup, i.e., the smallest sensitive group s with the least frequent label y (in this case it is + label
with race as Black). Thus, the attack algorithms effectively exploit the fact that fair models give a
higher weight to points from the under-represented areas of the distribution to satisfy the constraints.
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Figure 2: Effect of fairness level δ on robustness across groups under adversarial sampling attack –
COMPAS dataset. For a given  the poisoning data is the same for all algorithms (generated using
Alg. 2 with λ = 100). The majority group (whites) contributes 61% of the training data. The curve
for accuracy of the minority group under the unconstrained model overlaps with that of the model
with exact fairness (λ = 0), thus is not visible. See Figure 5 for adversarial labeling results.
See Figure 11 for the distribution of poisoning points in all experiments. We also compute the
accuracy of trained models on their poisoning data. The accuracy of fair models with δ = 0.01 on
the poisoning data from Algorithm 2 is approximately 0.2 at  = 0.1, which increases to almost 0.4
at  = 0.2. Whereas, the accuracy of unconstrained models on the poisoning data remains more or
less zero, implying that the unconstrained models ignore these points. See Figure 7 for the accuracy
of models on their clean and poisoning data. We observe that by increasing , the accuracy of fair
models on their poisoning data Dp increases, whereas it decreases on their clean training data Dc.
This reduces their ability to learn the underlying data distribution and generalize to the (clean) test
data.
Fairness gap on test data. The ultimate objective of fair machine learning is to extend
fairness to test data. Table 1 shows how adversarial bias can jeopardize the fairness generalizability
of fair models. We observe that, for λ > 0, the lower the fairness level δ on training data is, the
higher the fairness gap on test data becomes. Note that e.g., for a fair model with δ = 0.01 under
adversarial sampling attack using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100, the fairness gap on the test data is
about 0.37. This fairness gap is even larger than the fairness gap of an unconstrained model (0.21 in
the benign setting and 0.26 under data poisoning). This shows that even by just controlling the
sampling process for a small fraction of the training set, without affecting the labels, attacker can
influence models trained with fairness constraints, to become more discriminatory than unconstrained
models.
6 Related Work
6.1 Fairness in Machine Learning
A classifier that is learned by minimizing the overall cumulative loss might not perform well on
one sensitive group (usually the minority group), when the distribution of features per each class
is different across groups. In order to address this problem, multiple definitions of fairness are
proposed in the literature. Examples include metric equality across sensitive groups [8, 19], individual
fairness [15], causality [28], and many techniques to satisfy group-based fairness (which is the focus of
this paper) such as pre-processing methods [32, 41], in-processing methods [1, 24, 39, 40], and post-
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Table 1: Fairness gap of attacked models on test data – COMPAS dataset, for  = 0.1. The
fairness gap ∆ is defined in (1). The numbers reflect how unfair the model is with respect to the
protected group in the test data. For fair models, compare numbers with δ (the guaranteed fairness
gap on training data). The farther apart ∆ and δ are, the less the fairness generalization is on test
data.
Attacks Unconstrained
Model
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.1)
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.01)
Fair [19]
(δ = 0)
Benign 0.21±0.07 0.11±0.06 0.06±0.04 0.07±0.04
Random sampling 0.19±0.07 0.08±0.03 0.11±0.05 0.13±0.07
Hard examples 0.19±0.08 0.09±0.03 0.13±0.05 0.15±0.07
Label flipping 0.23±0.07 0.09±0.04 0.07±0.04 0.1±0.06
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.26±0.08 0.19±0.07 0.30±0.07 0.27±0.08
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 0.29±0.06 0.37±0.09 0.53±0.05
Adv. sampling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 0.12±0.07 0.21±0.10 0.25±0.13
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.28±0.08 0.13±0.05 0.19±0.08 0.25±0.08
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 0.28±0.05 0.39±0.08 0.55±0.04
Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 0.11±0.06 0.12±0.04 0.13±0.09
processing methods [19]. Pre-processing methods aim at finding a new representation of data such
that it retains as much information of input features as possible, except those which can lead to bias.
In-processing methods enforce fairness during the training process, for example, by incorporating the
fairness constraints into the objective function as a regularization term. Post-processing methods
correct the predictions of a given trained model, without modifying the training data or the training
process. Please refer to [33] for a recent survey on methods to achieve fairness. In this work, we
focus on the notion of Equalized odds [19] and use the reductions approach [1] (in-processing) and
post-processing approach [19] to train fair models.
Imposing fairness constraints might come at a cost of the model’s performance. The effect of fair
classification on accuracy and the compatibility of various definitions with each other have been
studied in some related works [10, 25]. Corbett-Davies et al. [10] show that the optimal decision rule
is different from the fair decision rules that satisfy fairness definitions (statistical parity, conditional
statistical parity, predictive equality). Thus, imposing fairness constraints has a cost on the model
accuracy. Corbett-Davies et al. [10] then evaluate the cost of fairness empirically. Kleinberg et al.
[25] show that it is impossible to achieve equal calibration, false positive rate and false negative rate,
if the fraction of positive labeled examples is different across sensitive groups.
6.2 Data Poisoning Attacks
Machine learning systems are susceptible to data poisoning attacks. In indiscriminate attacks,
which is the focus of this paper, the adversary’s objective is to degrade the test accuracy of the
model [3, 21, 26, 27, 31, 34, 35]. In targeted attacks, the adversary seeks to impose the loss on
specific test data points or small sub-populations [6, 9, 17, 26, 36, 38].
Steinhardt et al. [37] propose an optimal algorithm for poisoning attacks on (unconstrained)
convex models, given a set of feasible poisoning data points. The algorithm relies on the assumption
that test loss of the target model can be approximated as training loss of the model on clean data
(assuming Dtest is drawn from the same distribution as the clean training data Dc). Our attack
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algorithm is inspired by this work and uses the same online learning framework. Note that, when
λ = 0 in Algorithm 2, it is equivalent to the algorithm in [37].
In our setting of adversarial sampling bias, the attacker is not allowed to modify the label y.
In clean-label data poisoning attacks [36], the attacker manages to reduce the accuracy of target
examples via injecting the correctly labeled data with modified features. Compared with this work,
the attacker in adversarial sampling bias is not permitted to change the features. Furthermore, the
objective of our attack is to reduce the accuracy of the model over the entire test data.
When the attacker is allowed to change both features and labels of the poisoning data, a typical
poisoning attack algorithm is gradient ascent, in which the attacker iteratively modifies each attack
point in the poisoning dataset by following the gradient of the test loss with respect to poisoning
training data. This kind of attack is first studied in the context of SVMs by Biggio et al. [3], and has
subsequently been extended to linear and logistic regression [35], topic modeling [34], collaborative
filtering [31], and neural networks [26]. In our setting, we assume the attacker is not allowed to
modify the features, as we focus on the most practical scenario in decision making processes that
move toward automation. An interesting future direction would be to allow changes of features and
design poisoning attacks using the gradient-based algorithm. Given more power to the attacker, it is
likely that the attacker could reduce the test accuracy more significantly.
6.3 Learning Fair Models from Noisy Training Data
In most practical scenarios, the training data used for learning models might be biased (under-
representation bias) and/or noisy (with mis-labeling). The mis-labeling phenomenon can be random
or adversarial. Mislabeling can be seen as a specific case of adversarial labeling bias, where the
attacker flips labels of data points only from a certain part of the population. Similarly, under-
representation bias can be considered as a specific case of adversarial sampling bias. Multiple works
in the literature study the impact of noisy and biased data on machine learning.
Calders and Žliobaite˙ [7] show that learning a regular unconstrained model from training data
with under-representation and mislabeling bias results in biased predictions on test data. Kallus
and Zhou [23] consider the case of systematic censoring in training data. For example, a model for
predicting whether an individual defaults a loan can be trained only on individuals who were already
granted a loan. Individuals who were not even granted loan cannot be present in the dataset. Such
systematic censoring can be seen as a form of sampling bias. This work shows that even after using
a fair classifier, that seeks to achieve fairness by equalizing accuracy metrics across sensitive groups,
the classifier can still be unfair on the population due to the systematic censoring in training data.
We also show a similar result in Table 6 that learning models on training data with adversarial bias
increases their fairness gap on the test data.
Under varying assumptions, multiple works [4, 11, 22, 29] have proposed strategies to account
for under-representation bias and mislabeling while learning models. De-Arteaga et al. [11] study
selective label bias, where true outcomes corresponding to a certain label cannot be learned (for
example in predicting recidivism risk), as such examples cannot be added to the training data.
Selective label bias can be considered as a form of sampling bias. The authors propose a method for
augmenting the dataset with human expert predictions to mitigate selective label bias. Assuming
that examples in certain sensitive groups are randomly mislabeled, Jiang and Nachum [22] propose
a re-weighting strategy for recovering the optimal classifier on unbiased data from training data
with labeling bias. When uniform random noise is present in the sensitive attribute, it is shown
that demographic parity gap of a fair classifier on test data increases [29]. The authors quantify the
increase in DP gap on test data at any level of noise in the label. Given the level of noise in sensitive
attribute, this is used to compute the exact level of DP gap that needs to be imposed on training
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data, for achieving a target DP gap on the test data. Blum and Stangl [4] consider a training set
corrupted by under-representation/labeling bias (or both). Assuming access to an infinite number of
samples and learning different classifiers for different sensitive groups, this work shows that ERM
with Equal Opportunity constraint on the biased data can recover the Bayes-optimal classifier for
the true data distribution.
All the above works [4, 11, 22, 29] assume that the noise and bias in training data is an uniform
distribution of under-representation/mislabeling over a subspace of points and study the consequences
of learning from training data with such bias. These results cannot translate to our case of adversarial
bias as we consider non-uniform bias over the input space, and our attacker introduces bias with the
specific intention of reducing test accuracy.
7 Broader Impact
AI governance frameworks released by multiple organizations such as the European union2 and
Google AI3 state that fairness and robustness are two key requirements for building trustworthy
automated systems. In fact, the AI governance document by Google AI mentions a library for training
with equalized odds constraints as a tool for fairness appraisal (page 14) and data poisoning as a
possible risk for AI safety (page 17).
In this work, we show that imposing group-fairness constraints on learning algorithms decreases
their robustness to poisoning attacks. This is a significant obstacle towards implementing trustworthy
machine learning systems. We specifically provide evidence that an attacker that can only control
the sampling and labeling process for a fraction of the training data can significantly degrade the
test accuracy of the models learned with fairness constraints. In fact, from a practical perspective,
the attack algorithms for adversarial bias, introduced in this paper, can easily and stealthily be
perpetrated in many existing systems, as similar to historical discrimination and/or selection bias.
This calls for an immediate attention to a theoretical study of the robustness properties for any fair
machine learning algorithm and the potential consequences of using such algorithms in presence of
adversarially biased data. Moreover, this calls for designing models which are not only fair, but
also robust. We suspect that there might be a fundamental trade-off between these two aspects
of trustworthy machine learning. We also show that learning with fairness constraints in presence
of adversarial bias results in a classifier that does not only have a poor test accuracy but is also
potentially more discriminatory on test data. Hence, machine learning system designers must be
cautious when deploying FairML in real world applications, as they might be building a system that
is both unfair and less robust.
8 Conclusions
We have introduced adversarial bias as a framework for data poisoning attacks against fair machine
learning. Our attack exploits the existing tension between fairness constraint and model accuracy,
and the fact that the fair models try to achieve equality on groups with different sensitive attributes
even though they do not have the same weight in the loss function of the model. Thus, our
experiments show that by adding a small percentage of adversarially sampled/labeled data points
2EU guidelines on ethics in artificial intelligence: Context and implementation https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640163/EPRS_BRI(2019)640163_EN.pdf
3Perspectives on Issues in AI Governance https://ai.google/static/documents/
perspectives-on-issues-in-ai-governance.pdf
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to the training set, the attacker can significantly reduce the model accuracy beyond what he can
achieve in unconstrained models. Adversarial bias also increases the fairness gap on test data.
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A Table of Notations
Table 2: List of Notations
Symbol Description Where it is defined
X Features space Section 2
Y Label space Section 2
X Random variable associated with features Section 2
Y Random variable associated with lables Section 2
(X,Y ) Underlying distribution of the data Section 2
D Training dataset Section 2
Dc Clean training dataset Section 2
n Size of the clean training dataset Section 2
Dp Poisoning training dataset Section 2
 The ratio of the size of poisoning data over the size of clean data in the training set Section 2
PrD Computing a probability empirically over a dataset D Section 2
Dk Attack dataset Section 2
Dtest Test dataset Section 2
S Sensitive/protected attribute Section 2
δ Guaranteed fairness level on training data Section 2
∆ Fairness gap Section 2
C(θ,D) Fairness constraint of fθ on dataset D Section 2
θ Model parameters Section 2
Θ Parameter space Section 2
fθ Classification model parameterized by θ Section 2
`(θ;x, y) Loss of fθ on data (x, y) Section 2
L(θ;D) Cumulative loss of fθ on dataset D Section 2
θˆ Optimal model parameters trained on D with fairness constrained Eq. (2)
λ Lagrange multiplier (penalty parameter) Section 3
D ∪ {(x, y)}k Adding k copies of the data point (x, y) to set D Section 4.1
M∗ Maximum loss under the optimal attack Eq. (7)
M(Dp) The imposed loss by poisoning dataset Dp on the fair model Eq. (7)
(xt, yt) The data point selected by Algorithm 1 at step t Section 4.1
θt The model parameter chosen by Algorithm 1 at step t Section 4.1
F(Dk) Feasible set of poisoning data points Section 4.1
η Learning rate Algorithm 1
D∗p Poisoning dataset produced by Algorithm 1 Section 4.1
Regret(T) Regret of Algorithm 1 after T steps Section 4.1
U(θ) Loss of model fθ under the optimal attack Appendix B.1
U∗ Minimum loss under the optimal attack minTt=1 U(θt) Appendix B.1
gt(θ) The loss function for online learning algorithm at step t Appendix B.1
θ˜ Optimal model parameters for minimizing the cumulative loss
∑T
t=1 gt(θ) Appendix B.1
ηt Learning rate at time t in Algorithm 1 used in the proof of Corollary 1 Appendix B.1
d Upper bound on the diameter of Θ Appendix B.1
G Upper bound on the norm of the subgradients of gt over Θ Appendix B.1
∆˜(θ,D) The convex relaxation for the fairness gap of equalized odds Appendix B.2
`l(θ;x, y) linear loss of model fθ on data point (x, y) Appendix B.2
Dy,s A set of data points from group s with label y in D Appendix B.2
ny,s The number of data points in Dy,s Appendix B.2
Ry,s(θ,D) Average linear loss of fθ for data points in Dy,s Appendix B.2
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B Supplementary Theoretical Results
B.1 Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. We should point out that in this proof we follow the approach of [37]. Assume T = n is
the time horizon. We have D∗p = {(x1, y1), · · · (xT , yT )} as the data poisoning set produced by
Algorithm 1. Also, θt is the parameter chosen by the algorithm at the t-th step. First, from max–min
inequality we have:
M∗ def= max
Dp
min
θ
 1
n
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp) + λ
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈Dp
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)

≤ min
θ
max
Dp
 1
n
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp) + λ
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈Dp
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)
 .
Furthermore, for a given θ we define:
U(θ)
def
= max
Dp
 1
n
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp) + λ
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈Dp
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)

=
1
n
L(θ;Dc) + max
(x,y)∈F(Dk)
[ · `(θ;x, y) + λ ·∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)] .
We define U∗ = minTt=1 U(θt). Note that for any given θ, we have M∗ ≤ U(θ). More specifically, we
have M∗ ≤ U∗.
From the definition of M∗, for any set, including D∗p, we have
min
θ
 1
n
L(θ;Dc ∪ D∗p) +
λ
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈D∗p
∆ (θ,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)
 = M(D∗p) ≤M∗
Let us define T different functions
gt(θ) =
1
n
L(θ;Dc) +  · `(θ;xt+1, yt+1) + λ ·∆(θ,Dc ∪ {(xt+1, yt+1)}n) , (10)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Let us define
θ˜ = argmin
θ∈Θ
T∑
t=1
gt(θ) .
Note that we have ∑T
t=1 gt(θ˜)
T
= M(D∗p) ≤M∗ ≤ U∗ ≤
∑T
t=1 gt(θ
t)
T
Finally, from the definition of regret we have:∑T
t=1 gt(θ
t)
T
−
∑T
t=1 gt(θ˜)
T
=
Regret(T )
T
,
which consequently completes the proof of the theorem.
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B.2 The Conditions for the Optimality of the Attack
In this section, we prove that under what conditions, our algorithm finds the (nearly) optimal solution
for the attack. We first state a direct consequence of Theorem 1 for a no-regret algorithm which
results from a convexity assumption for functions gt(θ). We then explain under what conditions this
convexity assumption is valid.
Corollary 1. Under the assumption that (i) loss function ` is convex in θ, (ii) ∆(θ,D) is convex
in θ and (iii) ηt = dG√t for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , Algorithm 1 produces the near optimal poisoning dataset D∗p,
such that
M∗ −M(D∗p) ≤
3Gd√
n
(11)
where ηt is step size at time t, d is an upper bond on the diameter of Θ, and G is an upper bound on
the norm of the subgradients of gt over Θ, i.e., ‖∇gt(θ)‖ ≤ G.
Proof. First note that Algorithm 1 exactly runs as online gradient descent algorithm for gt(θ)
functions. From the assumptions (i) and (ii), we conclude that functions gt(θ) are convex. The
theoretical guarantee of the online gradient descent algorithm for convex functions [20] allows us to
bound the average regret
Regret(T )
T
≤ 3Gd√
T
,
where d is an upper bond on the diameter of Θ, and G is an upper bound on the norm of the
subgradients of gt over Θ, i.e., ‖∇gt(θ)‖ ≤ G. Finally, the proof is concluded from this bound for
the regret and the result of Theorem 1.
Next, we discuss the optimality conditions for linear classifiers with a convex loss, e.g., `(θ;x, y) =
max(0, 1− y〈θ, x〉) for SVM. In our attack, we use equalized odds as our fairness constraint which
is non-convex. We adopt simplification proposed by Donini et al. [13] to reach convex relaxations
of loss and fairness constraint. Instead of balancing prediction error, Donini et al. [13] propose a
fairness definition as balancing the risk among two sensitive groups. Following the same idea, we
define the linear loss as `l (e.g., `l = (1− fθ(x))/2 for SVM). Based on the linear loss, the convex
relaxation for the fairness gap of equalized odds is defined as follows:
∆˜(θ,D) := |R
+,a(θ,D)−R+,b(θ,D)|+ |R−,a(θ,D)−R−,b(θ,D)|
2
, (12)
for Ry,s(θ,D) = 1ny,s
∑
(x,y)∈Dy,s `l(θ;x, y) where Dy,s is the set of data points from group s with
label y in D and ny,s = |Dy,s|. To find the optimal attack for the EO fair model, in Eq. (7), we
replace loss ` with a convex loss (e.g. Hinge loss) `c and replace ∆(fθ;D) with the convex relaxation
∆˜(θ;D). Hence, Algorithm 1 produces the nearly optimal poisoning set D∗p such that it has the
maximal damage on the fair model under our approximations.
As a future research direction, one could try to design new online algorithms that achieve small
regrets in the non-convex setting or under better approximations of the fairness constraint. Our
framework can then utilize such online algorithms to further investigate the effect of data poisoning
attacks on the robustness of models with fairness constraints.
B.3 Pseudocode of the Algorithm from Section 4.2
For the sake of completeness, we present the full pseudo-code for our data poisoning algorithm
proposed in Section 4.2.
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Algorithm 2
1: Input: Clean data Dc, n = |Dc|, feasible poisoning set F(Dk), number of poisoning data n,
penalty parameter (Lagrange multiplier) λ, learning rate η.
2: Output: Poisoning dataset Dp.
3: Initialize θ0
4: for t = 1, · · · , n do
5: (xt, yt)← argmax(x,y)∈F(Dk)
[
 · `(θt−1;x, y) + λ ·∆ (θt−1,Dc ∪ {(x, y)}n)]
6: Dp ← Dp ∪ {(xt, yt)}
7: θt ← θt−1 − η
(∇L(θt−1;Dc)
n +  · ∇`(θt−1;xt, yt)
)
8: end for
Table 3: Distribution of data points in clean training dataset Dc and attack dataset Dk - COMPAS
dataset.
Dc Dk
y = − y = + y = − y = +
s = 0 28.5% 31.8% s = 0 29.0% 31.1%
s = 1 32.5% 7.2% s = 1 16.0% 23.9%
C Fair Machine Learning Algorithms
The post-processing approach is the first proposed algorithm to achieve equalized odds [19]. The
fair model is obtained by adjusting a trained unconstrained model so as to remove the discrimination
according to equalized odds. The outcome of this approach is a randomized classifier that assigns
to each data point a probability of changing the prediction output by the unconstrained model,
conditional on its protected attribute, and predicted label. These probabilities are computed by a
linear program that optimizes the expected loss.
Many methods have been proposed to achieve fairness in machine learning (see [33] for a recent
survey). The reductions approach proposed by [1] trains a fair randomized classifier over a
hypothesis class by reducing the constrained optimization problem to learning a sequence of cost-
sensitive classification models. Cost-sensitive classification is used in this as an oracle to solve
classification problems resulted from a two-player game: one player (primal variables) minimizes the
loss function; the other player (dual variables) maximizes the fairness violation (constraints).
D Supplementary Experimental Results
For the following section, we present the detailed experimental results on COMPAS and Adult
dataset. All the results on COMPAS dataset are averaged over 100 runs with different random seeds.
On Adult dataset, all the results are averaged over 50 runs with different random seeds.
D.1 Details of datasets and models
We use two datasets in our evaluation, their details are described below.
COMPAS. COMPAS [30] dataset contains 5278 data samples. The classification task is to
predict recidivism risk from criminal history and demographics. We consider race as the sensitive
attribute and include records only with white/black as race. There are 3175 records (60.2%) for the
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Table 4: Distribution of data points in clean training dataset Dc and attack dataset Dk - Adult
dataset.
Dc Dk
y = − y = + y = − y = +
s = 0 48.5% 16.5% s = 0 45.0% 23.4%
s = 1 32.3% 2.6% s = 1 27.2% 4.4%
sensitive attribute as white. Among the white group, 52.3% have positive labels while among the
black group, this number is 41.9%. Overall, there are 2483 records (47%) are labeled positive.
Pre-processing A model trained with the original dataset can only achieve low accuracy (66.6%
for the Logistic regression model, compared to constant prediction classifier that can achieve 53%
accuracy), which does not help the understanding of the model’s behavior in the presence of data
poisoning attacks. To get rid of the noise that exists in the dataset, we pre-process the dataset as
follows: we train an SVM model with RBF kernel on the entire dataset and only keep 60% of the
data points which have the smallest loss. To create the training data Dc, test data Dtest and attack
dataset Dk, we randomly split the clean data in the corresponding ratio 4:1:1. Hard examples (the
left out data points) are added to the attack dataset.
Data distribution The data distribution of points in clean training dataset Dc and attack
dataset Dk after pre-processing are presented in Table 3. The numbers are the average values over
all the datasets we evaluated on. On average, Dc contains 2111 samples, Dtest 528 samples. Dk
consists of 2639 samples out of which 2112 are hard examples.. A Logistic regression model trained
on Dc achieves on average 94% accuracy on test data.
Model We use Logistic regression for classification.
UCI Adult (Census Income). Adult dataset [14] includes 48,842 records with 14 attributes
such as age, gender, education, marital status, occupation, working hours, and native country. The
(binary) classification task is to predict if a person makes over $50K a year based on the census
attributes. We consider gender (male and female) as the sensitive attribute. In this dataset, 66.8%
are males, and 23.9% are labeled one, i.e having an income over $50K a year. Among male samples,
30.4% are positive samples; for the females, this number is 10.9%.
Pre-processing A model trained on this dataset generally achieves below 90% accuracy (Logistic
regression: 85.3%, 2-layer fully connected neural network with 32 hidden units each layer: 85.3% on
training data, compared to a constant prediction classifier that can achieve 76.1% accuracy). To
enhance the model accuracy, we apply similar pre-processing steps as on COMPAS: we train an
SVM model with Linear kernel on the entire dataset and keep 90% of the data points which have the
smallest loss. The number of females with income above $50K is small; hence we randomly split 1/2
of the data for Dk. Of the remaining data, 70% are use for Dc and 30% for Dtest. Hard examples
(the left out data points) are added to the attack dataset.
Data distribution The data distribution of the points in clean training dataset Dc and attack
dataset Dk after pre-processing are presented in Table 4. The numbers are the average values over
all the datasets we evaluated on. On average, Dc contains 15385 samples, Dtest 6594 samples. Dk
consists of 26863 samples. Dc maintains approximately the same fractions of males and females as
in the original dataset. A Logistic regression model trained on Dc achieves on average 94% accuracy
on test data.
Model We use Logistic regression for classification.
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D.2 Implementation and Parameters Selection
To generate poisoning data points, we implement Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
As discussed in B.2, in Algorithm 1, the attacker uses an SVM model (due to the linear
approximation of the fairness gap in Equation (12)). For this SVM model, we use Hinge loss for the
classification loss and linear loss for evaluating the fairness gap as mentioned in B.2. Note that the
linear function used to approximate ∆ can fall out of range ([0, 1]). Having large λ implies assigning
more weight to this term and can result in a bad approximation. We therefore test with small λ,
with λ ∈ {0.1, , 10} and show the results when λ =  for COMPAS and λ = 0.1 for Adult.
In Algorithm 2, we use Logistic regression models. Since we measure the exact ∆ of the model
and want that ∆ to have a large impact on finding a new poisoning data point in each iteration.
This leads to the selection of a larger λ. We choose λ ∈ {, 10, 100} and show λ = 100 in the
evaluation for both datasets.
For both algorithms, we use η = 0.001 as the learning rate.
To train a fair model, we use the post-processing method [19] and reductions approach [1]. We
use the implementation of these algorithms provided in [1]4. Note that while the post-processing
approach allows achieving exact fairness on the training data, the implementation of the reductions
approach requires a strictly positive δ. We use default values for all hyper-parameters from the
available implementation.
It is important to note that, the output of these approaches is a randomized classifier. We,
therefore, use the expected accuracy to measure the classification performance, given by
Acc(θ;D) = 1− 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
|fθ(x)− y|, (13)
where fθ(x) is the expected prediction of randomized classifier fθ. For the unconstrained models, fθ
is the deterministic prediction.
D.3 Robustness evaluation
In this section, we provide the detailed results about the test accuracy and fairness gap of the target
models for both COMPAS and Adult datasets, as discussed in Section 5.2. We show that the fair
models are more vulnerable to the poisoning attack compared with the unconstrained model. In
addition, the test accuracy and the fairness property of fair models are both compromised.
Test accuracy In the Table 5, we compare the effect of poisoning attacks on unconstrained models
(without fairness constraint) with different fair models at different desired fairness levels δ on two
datasets (COMPAS and Adult), when the attacker controls 10% of the training data i.e.,  = 0.1.
The “Unconstrained Model” column corresponds to the test accuracy of the unconstrained model.
The “Fair [1] (δ = 0.1)” and the “Fair [1] (δ = 0.01)” columns respectively correspond to the test
accuracy of the fair models trained with the Reductions approach [1] at δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.01. The
“Fair [19] (δ = 0)” column corresponds to the fair model trained with the Post-processing method [19]
with exact fairness, i.e δ = 0. For each dataset, “Benign” row shows the test accuracy for models
trained on data without any poisoning attack i.e.,  = 0. We compare these with the test accuracy
of corresponding models that are learned from poisoned data.
We observe that when the models are trained with fairness, the drop in test accuracy are more
significant than when the constraints are absent in both adversarial labeling and adversarial sampling
4See https://github.com/fairlearn/fairlearn
21
Table 5: Test accuracy of attacked models under adversarial bias – COMPAS and Adult
datasets, for  = 0.1. The numbers reflect test accuracy (defined in (13)) of attacked models. The
lower the numbers are, the more effective the attacks are and the less robust the models are against
the attacks. The numbers in bold are the smallest accuracies of the target models against different
attack algorithms in the adversarial bias or adversarial labeling setting.
Dataset Attacks Unconstrained
Model
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.1)
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.01)
Fair [19]
(δ = 0)
COMPAS
Benign 93.7±5.6 94.0±5.6 93.5±1.7 87.4±3.8
Random sampling 94.3±0.9 92.1±1.6 89.2±1.6 84.3±1.1
Hard examples 94.2±1.0 91.5±1.7 88.2±2.6 83.7±1.1
Label flipping 94.0±1.0 92.8±1.4 90.8±2.0 84.4±1.2
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 87.6±1.6 81.5±1.7 78.0±2.3 70.8±1.6
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 80.6±1.9 73.1±3.0 71.6±1.4
Adv. sampling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 81.2±1.4 77.6±2.2 73.9±1.8
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 84.8±1.7 76.3±1.8 73.3±1.7 68.3±1.7
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 77.6±1.3 71.0±2.8 70.1±1.3
Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 80.1±3.3 76.6±3.2 70.5±1.8
Adult
Benign 94.3±0.3 94.3±0.3 93.8±0.3 92.7±0.4
Random sampling 94.3±0.3 94.3±0.3 93.7±0.3 92.3±0.3
Hard examples 94.2±0.3 94.1±0.3 92.6±0.4 90.8±0.4
Label flipping 93.3±0.4 91.0±0.5 89.2±0.4 88.2±0.4
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 94.0±0.3 93.1±0.5 91.7±0.6 89.6±0.5
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 92.5±0.5 92.2±0.4 90.1±0.5
Adv. sampling (Alg. 1, λ = 0.1) - 92.3±0.5 92.3±0.5 89.3±0.4
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 89.3±0.9 87.2±0.6 83.9±0.5 84.6±0.6
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 85.5±1.2 80.9±1.7 81.1±1.6
Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = 0.1) - 87.5±0.6 83.9±0.8 84.6±0.7
setting. We notice that our attacks outperform the baseline attacks on both datasets in both
adversarial bias setting (adversarial labeling and adversarial sampling). Even in the adversarial
sampling setting, using our proposed attack strategies, the attacker manages to reduce the test
accuracy of the target model more than labeling flipping attack. This shows the effectiveness of
our attack strategies. In addition, an increase in the desired fairness level, i.e when δ decreases,
correlates with an increase in the accuracy drop. This shows fair models are more vulnerable to
poisoning attacks than unconstrained models. Note that on Adult, the drops are not as large as they
are on COMPAS. However, the constant prediction classifier trained on Adult dataset can achieve
81% accuracy. In other words, the fair models trained on poisoned datasets can only perform barely
better than constant prediction classifier. Our attacks are still effective on Adult dataset.
The overall results in the Table 5 reflect the effectiveness of our strategies and provide evidence
that the fair model is more vulnerable than the unconstrained model.
Fairness gap In Table 6, we compare the effect of poisoning attacks on unconstrained model
(without fairness constraint) with different fair models at different δ on two datasets (COMPAS and
Adult), when  = 0.1. Similar to the Table 5, the columns 4-7 (“Unconstrained Model”, “Fair [1]
(δ = 0.1)”, “Fair [1] (δ = 0.01)”, “Fair [19] (δ = 0)) show the fairness gap on test datasets ∆(θ;Dtest)
of the unconstrained models, of the fair models trained with the Reductions approach [1] at δ = 0.1
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Table 6: Fairness gap of attacked models on test data – COMPAS and Adult datasets, for
 = 0.1. The fairness gap ∆ is defined in (1). The numbers reflect how unfair the model is with
respect to the protected group in the test data. For fair models, compare numbers with δ (the
guaranteed fairness gap on training data). The farther apart ∆ and δ are, the less the fairness
generalization is on test data. The numbers in bold are the largest ∆ of the target models against
different attack algorithms in the adversarial bias or adversarial labeling setting.
Dataset Attacks Unconstrained
Model
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.1)
Fair [1]
(δ = 0.01)
Fair [19]
(δ = 0)
COMPAS
Benign 0.21±0.07 0.11±0.06 0.06±0.04 0.07±0.04
Random Sampling 0.19±0.07 0.08±0.03 0.11±0.05 0.13±0.07
Hard examples 0.19±0.08 0.09±0.03 0.13±0.05 0.15±0.07
Label flipping 0.23±0.07 0.09±0.04 0.07±0.04 0.10±0.06
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.26±0.08 0.19±0.07 0.30±0.07 0.27±0.08
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 0.29±0.06 0.37±0.09 0.53±0.05
Adv. sampling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 0.12±0.07 0.21±0.10 0.25±0.13
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.28±0.08 0.13±0.05 0.19±0.08 0.25±0.08
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 0.28±0.05 0.39±0.08 0.55±0.04
Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = ) - 0.11±0.06 0.12±0.04 0.13±0.09
Adult
Benign 0.07±0.03 0.07±0.03 0.04±0.02 0.03±0.02
Random sampling 0.07±0.03 0.07±0.03 0.03±0.02 0.03±0.02
Hard examples 0.08±0.03 0.06±0.03 0.04±0.02 0.06±0.03
Label flipping 0.08±0.04 0.10±0.04 0.24±0.04 0.24±0.04
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.06±0.03 0.03±0.02 0.12±0.03 0.17±0.04
Adv. sampling (Alg. 2, λ = 100 - 0.06±0.03 0.07±0.02 0.19±0.04
Adv. sampling (Alg. 1, λ = 0.1) - 0.05±0.03 0.05±0.02 0.14±0.05
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 0) [37] 0.06±0.04 0.07±0.03 0.21±0.04 0.27±0.04
Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100) - 0.18±0.06 0.09±0.08 0.09±0.19
Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = 0.1) - 0.11±0.04 0.23±0.05 0.34±0.04
and δ = 0.01 and of fair models trained with the Post-processing method [19] with exact fairness, i.e
δ = 0 , respectively. For each dataset, “Benign” row shows the fairness gap on the test dataset for
models trained on data without any poisoning attack i.e.,  = 0. We compare these with the fairness
gap on test dataset of corresponding models learned from poisoned data.
We notice that the fairness gap of fair models trained on the poisoned data is much larger than
those of fair models trained on clean data (as shown in “Benign” row). This implies fair models
trained on poisoned data become less fair on test dataset when attacks are present in both adversarial
sampling bias and adversarial labeling bias setting.
Interestingly, the fairness gap of the fair models is larger than that of the unconstrained model
when adversarial bias are present in the training dataset. In addition, an increase in the desired
fairness level, i.e when δ decreases, is associated with an increase in the fairness gap on the test
dataset. This shows that not only does poisoning attacks can cause accuracy drops, but they are
also able to make fair models more discriminatory on test data than unconstrained models.
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Figure 3: Test accuracy of unconstrained and fair models under data poisoning attacks – COMPAS
dataset. The x-axis  is the ratio of the size of poisoning dataset Dp to the size of clean dataset
Dc, and reflects the contamination level of training set. We compare the impact of adversarial bias
with baselines and poisoning attacks against unconstrained models, for various . The difference
between test accuracy at  = 0 (benign setting) and larger  values reflects the impact of the attack.
Constant prediction always outputs the majority label in clean dataset.
D.4 Conflict between fairness and robustness.
In Figure 3 and Figure 4, we compare the test accuracy of target model at different fractions of
poisoning data selected using all the attack strategies on COMPAS and Adult dataset respectively.
On COMPAS dataset, for unconstrained models, only Algorithm 2 (λ = 0) has an effect, causing
a 10% drop in accuracy when  = 0.2 and the accuracy hardly decreases when  increases from 0.1 to
0.2 in the adversarial labeling bias setting. We observe a similar result for the adversarial sampling
bias. On fair models, we can observe that both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 (with λ = 100 and
0) have a significantly better performance than Label flipping attack and adding Hard examples.
The performance of Algorithm 2 is better than that of Algorithm 1, as Algorithm 1 uses a surrogate
linear loss for evaluating the fairness gap ∆(θ;Dc ∪ Dp), whereas Algorithm 2 computes the exact
fairness gap. Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 and 0 show similar results at smaller fractions of poisoning
data ( < 0.1) and start to diverge at higher values of  due to increase in contribution of fairness
gap term, with the former approaching the Constant classifier baseline at  = 0.2.
For the Adult dataset, notice that the Constant prediction baseline has good accuracy (>80%).
Hence, the relative accuracy drop on the Adult dataset is not as significant as that on the COMPAS
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Figure 4: Test accuracy of unconstrained and fair models under data poisoning attacks – Adult
dataset. The x-axis  is the ratio of the size of poisoning dataset Dp to the size of clean dataset
Dc, and reflects the contamination level of training set. We compare the impact of adversarial bias
with baselines and poisoning attacks against unconstrained models, for various . The difference
between test accuracy at  = 0 (benign setting) and larger  values reflects the impact of the attack.
Constant prediction always outputs the majority label in clean dataset.
dataset. However, we can still observe similar results that compared to unconstrained models, fair
models witness a greater accuracy drop, with our proposed attacks perform significantly better
than the baselines. The three algorithms have similar results both when the fair models are trained
with [19] and [1]. We observe that the plots for Algorithm 2 fluctuate in both adversarial sampling
and adversarial labeling settings when  increases. The detailed explanations are presented in
Appendix D.6.
D.5 Effect of fairness level on impact of adversarial bias
In Figure 5 and Figure 6, we show the effect of fairness level δ on impact of adversarial bias for
COMPAS and Adult dataset respectively. To measure the influence of fairness level δ, we generate
poisoning data using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 and Algorithm 1 with λ =  for both adversarial
labeling and adversarial sampling settings on COMPAS dataset. On Adult dataset, we generate
poisoning data using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 and Algorithm 1 with λ = 0.1. We measure the test
accuracy of models learned with different values of fairness level δ. We can observe that the drop in
accuracy for the same fraction of poisoning data is higher for models with stricter fairness constraints
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(smaller δ). This shows that the more fair a model tries to be, the more vulnerable it becomes to
poisoning attacks. In Figure 5 and Figure 6, we also present the majority (the protected group with
a larger number of samples) accuracy and minority accuracy. It is clear that the accuracy drop for
the majorities is more significant than that for minorities for all the cases. In the Appendix D.9, we
show that the algorithms choose the points with large loss from the smallest subgroup (subgroups
are determined by the protected attribute and the label). As a result, in order to achieve fairness on
the poisoned dataset, fair models are more likely to reduce the accuracy of the majority group.
We notice that, in Figure 6(a), accuracy plots fluctuate when  increases, which is not observed
in Figure 6(b) and Figure 5. In Appendix D.6, we present the detailed explanations.
D.6 Performance of Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 on Adult dataset
We notice that there are accuracy fluctuations for the fair models evaluated on the poisoning data
selected by Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 for the Adult dataset. Recall that, the algorithm selects
poisoning data from the attack dataset without replacement. In each iteration, it selects the data
point that maximizes the classification loss plus the fairness gap (as at Line 5 in Algorithm 2). As
shown in Figure 11 and 12, Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 has a significant preference to select poisoning
data that would result in a large fairness gap. Thus, it chooses data that would fall into the smallest
subgroup in the training set. This is shown to be very effective in the case of COMPAS dataset and
can lead to a sharp decrease in the model accuracy even for small  (see Figure 1). However, this
greedy algorithm in the case of small attack sets, and no repetition in the poisoning data, can result
in the degradation of attack performance for larger  values, as we see in Figure 4.
In more detail, the reason behind the attack behavior on Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 for larger 
on the Adult dataset is the following.
In the adversarial sampling setting, the size of the smallest subgroup (y = + and s = 1) in the
attack dataset is only equivalent to  = 7.69% poisoning data. For larger values of , the attacker
will choose data from other subgroups, which cannot further harm the model accuracy, thus reduces
the effect of the data poisoning.
In the adversarial labeling setting, with large , the number of poisoning data points is larger
than the size of subgroups with positive labels (y = +) in Dc; typically when  = 0.2, |Dp| > 3000
whereas the number of samples with y = + in Dc is 2943 on average. Relying on choosing points to
select data points to maximize ∆ results in the possibility of choosing points from any subgroups
with positive labels (as shown in Figure 8(b)), since poisoning data points can dominate any of these
subgroups. In other words, the smallest subgroup of the clean training dataset is not the smallest
subgroup of the training dataset.
In summary, the fluctuation in the figures is due to the significant effect of maximizing the
fairness gap. In fact, in both adversarial sampling and labeling settings, Algorithm 2 (λ = 100)
achieves the same performances with a smaller  as the other attacks with larger . These results, in
effect, reflects the effectiveness of the algorithm.
D.7 Training accuracy of poisoned dataset
In Figure 7 and Figure 8, the accuracy of the unconstrained model on the poisoning data Dp is
compared with the corresponding accuracy of fair models with different fairness level δ on COMPAS
and Adult dataset respectively. The poisoning data Dp is selected using Algorithm 2 with λ = 0 for
the unconstrained model for both adversarial labeling and adversarial sampling settings. For fair
models, we evaluate on poisoning dataset selected using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 and λ = 0.1 on
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Figure 5: Effect of fairness level δ on robustness across groups under adversarial sampling and
adversarial labeling attacks – COMPAS dataset. The majority group (whites) contributes 61% of
the training data. 27
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Figure 6: Effect of fairness level δ on robustness across groups under adversarial sampling and
adversarial labeling attacks – Adult dataset. The majority group (males) contributes 66% of the
training data. 28
Adult dataset. For the fair models trained on COMPAS dataset, we evaluate on poisoning dataset
selected using Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 and λ = .
On the COMPAS dataset, from Figure 7, we can observe that, for the fair model using [1], as the
value of δ decreases, the accuracy of the model increases on poisoning data Dp and decreases on Dc.
This implies poisoning data reduce fair models’ ability to learn from clean data. In Figure 7, note that
the post-processing method does not impose the fairness constraint during the training but uses the
predictions of the unconstrained model trained in the standard way and makes corrections to achieve
fairness. Depending on which subgroups poisoning data points belong to, fair models trained with
[19] show different behavior. For example, when poisoning data points have the sensitive attribute
s = 1 and label y = +, post-processing tends to make corrections for the majority group (observed
in Figure 5(a)). The accuracy of poisoning data remains similar to that of the unconstrained model,
but the accuracy of clean data decreases significantly.
On Adult dataset, from Figure 8, we can also observe that the fair models have a higher accuracy
on the poisoning data compared with the unconstrained model. In Figure 8(a), we notice that the
accuracy of the poisoning data increases when  increases from 0 to 0.05. After that, the accuracy
decreases for the fair models. We provide detailed explanations in Appendix D.6.
D.8 Fairness gap of the regualar model on poisoned dataset
To investigate the effectiveness of our attacks, we train an unconstrained classifier without any
fairness constraints and measure the fairness gap ∆(θ;Dc ∪ Dp) of the poisoned training dataset
generated by different algorithms. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the results for COMPAS and Adult
dataset respectively.
On the COMPAS dataset, from Figure 3, we observe a correlation between attack performance
and its fairness gap on the training data. For the baseline attacks (Label flipping, Random sampling,
Hard examples), the slight increase in ∆ corresponds to a small accuracy drop on the test data.
For our attacks, ∆ quickly increases when  ≤ 0.1, and the corresponding test accuracy also show
significant declines. When  > 0.1, for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 with λ = 0, ∆ stops increasing
and the test accuracy begins to level. By contrast, for Algorithm 2 with λ = 100, ∆ continues to
rise and the attack performance becomes significantly better than all other attacks.
On the Adult dataset, in Figure 10 adversarial sampling, the ∆ quickly increases when  ≤ 0.05
for our attacks, and then decreases as we increase the . A similar wave can be observed from
Figure 10 adversarial labeling. The detailed explanations are presented in the Appendix D.6.
D.9 Distribution of the poisoning data
In Figure 11 and Figure 12, we show group membership based on the protected attribute and labels
of the data which are generated via different attack strategies on COMPAS and Adult dataset
respectively.
Note that, for COMPAS dataset, we use the race as the protected attribute (s = 0 represents
“White” and s = 1 represents “Black”). The number of samples with s = 1, y = + is the smallest
among the four combinations of labels and the protected attribute. As shown in Figure 3, the attack
algorithms in the first two rows are more effective compared with baselines in the second row. As
shown in sub-figures (a)-(f), in more effective attacks, most poisoning data points are from the
smallest subgroup (positive labeled points from the minority).
On Adult dataset, we observe the similar phenomena, and we use the gender as the protected
attribute where s = 0 represents “Male” and s = 1 represents “Female”. It is also important to pay
attention to the fact that on this dataset, the number of samples with s = 1 is relatively small
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(33.2%) and those with s = 1, y = + only account for 3.6% of the dataset. Due to this, finding
influential data points from this subgroup is not always possible. Instead, as shown in Figure 12, our
attacks mainly select data with y = +. Algorithm 2 with λ = 100 finds more point with s = 1, y = +
and as shown in Figure 4 has a marginally better performance.
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Figure 7: Accuracy of clean training data and poisoning data under adversarial sampling and
adversarial labeling attacks – COMPAS dataset.
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Figure 8: Accuracy of clean training data and poisoning data under adversarial sampling and
adversarial labeling attacks – Adult dataset.
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Figure 9: Fairness gap on the unconstrained model with respect to the training data – COMPAS
dataset. An unconstrained model is learned on the training data that includes poisoning data
generated by Alg. 2 (λ = 100). The fairness gap ∆ is defined in (1). The numbers reflect how unfair
this unconstrained model is with respect to the protected group on the training data.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6

Fa
ir
ne
ss
ga
p
on
tr
ai
ni
ng
da
ta
Unconstrained Model - Adv. Sampling
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6

Unconstrained Model - Adv. Labeling
Alg. 2 (λ = 0) [37] Alg. 2 (λ = 100) Alg. 1 (λ = 0.1) Random sampling
Hard example Label flipping
Figure 10: Fairness gap on the unconstrained model with respect to the training data – Adult dataset.
An unconstrained model is learned on the training data that includes poisoning data generated
by Alg. 2 (λ = 100). The fairness gap ∆ is defined in (1). The numbers reflect how unfair this
unconstrained model is with respect to the protected group on the training data.
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0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
20
40
60
80
100

(e) Adv. labeling (Alg. 2, λ = 100)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
20
40
60
80
100

(f) Adv. labeling (Alg. 1, λ = )
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
20
40
60
80
100

P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
(g) Random sampling
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
20
40
60
80
100

(h) Hard examples
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
20
40
60
80
100

(i) Label flipping
Figure 11: Distribution of the poisoning data under adversarial attacks – COMPAS dataset. We
report the protected attribute (s = 0 for whites and s = 1 for blacks) and labels of the poisoning
data for various . For every value of , the number for each combination of the protected attribute
and label reflects the percentage of points with this combination in the poisoning data.
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Figure 12: Distribution of the poisoning data under adversarial attacks – Adult dataset. We report the
protected attribute (s = 0 for males and s = 1 for females) and labels of the poisoning data for various . For
every value of , the number for each combination of the protected attribute and label reflects the percentage
of points with this combination in the poisoning data.
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